"It is not believed that the
Oklahoma Welfare Act [i.e., the OIWA] may be used as authority to reorganize the
existing tribal government of the Cherokee Nation. On the contrary, that Act
appears to contemplate the creation of a new, separate and distinct
organization, to adopt its own constitution and bylaws and to procure a charter
of incorporation without regard to the existing government. With respect to the
existing tribal government, the freedman and intermarried whites, as well as
other citizens of the Cherokee Nation, shown on the final rolls, have a voice in
the limited tribal affairs which remain. If it is desired to deny the freedmen
and intermarried whites the right to vote on the proposed constitution . . . of
the new organization to be created under the Oklahoma Welfare Act, it is
believed that the powers and jurisdiction of the new organization should be
limited to the property and other benefits to be acquired under the Act. Those
persons whose names are on the final rolls of the Cherokee Nation have certain
rights in the remaining assets of the tribe, and if any attempt were made to
deny them the right to vote on matters which may affect such rights, it would
doubtless give rise to litigation."
The 1937
opinion continues: "The existing tribal government should be permitted to
exercise control over the present tribal assets and any benefits accruing
therefrom should be distributed in accordance with the final rolls of the
Cherokee Nation and the constitution . . . to be issued to the new organization
to be created under the Act should be limited in . . . operation so as to
exclude such tribal assets. If the new organization is so constituted the
freedmen and intermarried whites, who are not entitled to benefits under the
Oklahoma Welfare Act, will have no cause to complain by reason of their having
been denied the right to vote in matters that do not concern them or in any
manner affect their property rights."
This
opinion was reaffirmed by Hazel E. Elbert, the Acting Assistant Secretary for
Indian Affairs of the Interior Department, as recently as February 4, 1988.
In sum,
the 1937 opinion seems to have concluded that (1) freedmen and whites, although
citizens and members of the Cherokee Nation by operation of treaty and statute,
do not qualify as "Indians" under the OIWA and are, therefore, apparently
ineligible to participate in the vote to reorganize under the OIWA, (2) although
ineligible to participate in the vote to reorganize under OIWA,, freedman and
whites shown on the final Cherokee rolls nonetheless have vested property rights
in tribal assets which must be protected, (3) any new Cherokee tribal entity
reorganized under OIWA must be deemed "a new, separate and distinct
organization" without any claim to the tribal assets of the pre-OIWA Cherokee
Nation, and (4) "the powers and jurisdiction" of any new tribal entity chartered
under OIWA would be limited to "the property and other benefits acquired" under
the OIWA, leaving the assets of the pre-OIWA Cherokee Nation to the surviving
enrollees including Indians, freedmen and whites.
Assuming
these legal conclusions are accurate, the reluctance of the CNO to reorganize
under the OIWA becomes readily apparent. If the CNO were to reorganize under the
OIWA, according to the logic of the 1937 legal opinion, the CNO would forfeit
all claims to the tribal assets of the pre-OIWA Cherokee Nation and as "a new,
separate and distinct organization" it could no longer claim to have succeeded
to all of the rights and interests of the pre-OIWA Cherokee Nation.
In short,
the 1937 opinion creates a difficult dilemma for the CNO. If the CNO does not
reorganize under the OIWA, its sovereign powers may still be subject to
debilitating statutory prohibitions enacted during the allotment era. Foremost
among these is probably the inability to establish a tribal court system. On the
other hand, if the CNO reorganizes under the OIWA, it may forfeit not only its
rights in the tribal assets of the old Cherokee Nation, but to any claim that it
is, in fact, the successor in interest to the old Cherokee Nation, thereby
creating a potentially devastating legal discontinuity in the life of the tribe.
Perhaps the best way to escape the horns of this dilemma is
simply to realize that it is almost certainly a false dilemma based on the
limited legal imagination of one Interior Department attorney 57 years ago. His
opinion is hardly written in stone, nor does it even carry the precedential
weight of a court decision. In fact, a moment's reflection on the state of
tribal rights of selfdetermination under current law suggests that the 1937
opinion is almost certainly wrong. There are many possible competing
interpretations of relevant statutory language that would enable the CNO to
reorganize under the OIWA without suffering the dire legal consequences
predicted in the 1937 opinion.
For
example, freedmen and whites on the final Cherokee rolls could plausibly be
deemed "persons of Indian descent" under Section 19 of the OIWA by virtue of
their formal status as citizens of the Cherokee Nation. In short, for
purposes of OIWA reorganization, the phrase "persons of Indian descent" could be
construed to refer not to Indians by blood, but to Indians by citizenship,
thereby giving freedmen and whites the right to vote for the adoption of an OIWA
constitution, should that be deemed desirable.
Alternatively, if the vote on constitutional reorganization under the OIWA were
limited only to "persons of Indian descent," in a strictly ethnological sense,
why should the exclusion of freedmen or whites on the final Cherokee rolls from
the vote to reorganize necessarily result in the creation of "a new, separate
and distinct organization" without any rights as the successor in interest to
the old Cherokee Nation? Clearly, the "persons of Indian descent"
entitled to vote could simply create a new successor Cherokee Nation under the
OIWA which continued to recognize the rights of the non-Indian enrollees as
citizens with vested property rights. The OIWA grant of voting rights only to
"persons of Indian descent" could be construed to override any contrary
statutory or treaty guarantees of equal participation by non-Indian enrollees
only for purposes of determining who is eligible to vote for reorganization
under OIWA.
There is
no basis at all in the language of the OIWA or the intent of its framers to
divest reorganized tribal governments of their right to stand as successors in
interest to preceding tribal governments. In fact, just the opposite is
true. Section 15 of the OIWA clearly preserves the claims of
reorganized tribes against the United States. The CNO is free to
reorganize under the OIWA, just as the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians
of Oklahoma did in 1950.
Unlawful Ratification
Procedures
Since the
1975 constitution of the CNO was not ratified pursuant to the OIWA, the CNO does
not enjoy the same legal protections as tribes which have elected to reorganize
under the OIWA. Practically speaking, this means that many of the allotment era
enactments limiting the powers of the Cherokee Nation may still be in force.
Apart from these statutory limitations, there are additional and even more
troubling grounds on which to question the legitimacy of the CNO government
arising from the strange circumstances surrounding the drafting and ratification
of the 1975 constitution.
The most
conspicuous legal problem with the 1975 constitution concerns the procedures
adopted for its ratification. According to Article 18 of the 1975 constitution,
that document was to become effective when approved by the U.S. President and
"when ratified by the qualified voters of the Cherokee Nation at an election
conducted pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the Principal
Chief." On what authority did the Principal Chief presume to possess
the lawful power to independently promulgate the "rules and regulation"
governing the ratification of a new constitution? This authority was
merely assumed by the Principal Chief Ross 0. Swimmer for reasons of political
expediency in violation of the amendment procedures specified in Section 10 of
Article VI of the 1839 constitution of the Cherokee Nation.
There can
be little doubt in the aftermath of the federal district court decision in
Harjo v. Kleppe that the 1839 constitution
continued in force despite the suspension of the bicameral legislative branch of
the Cherokee government for some sixty years. 420 F.Supp. 1110 (D.D.C.
1976), aff’d sub nom., Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In
Harjo, the court found that, despite the original intention of Congress to
terminate the Creek Nation at the turn of the century, the Creek tribal
government created by the Creek constitution of 1867 had never been dissolved by
statute and, instead, had been explicitly extended. 420 F.Supp. at
1129. As Congress used the same provision to extend the Cherokee
government in the 1906 Five Tribes Act as it did to extend the Creek government,
the conclusion that the 1839 Cherokee constitution was in force in 1975 seems
inescapable under the reasoning of the Harjo decision.
Given
that the 1839 constitution must be deemed to have been in effect in 1975, the
only legally permissible procedures for amending the 1839 constitution were to
be found in the 1839 constitution itself. In order to amend the 1839
constitution the Swimmer government would have had to first reconvene the
bicameral National Council of the Cherokee Nation. He failed to do this.
After
reconvening the National Council, two-thirds of each house would have had to
have approved the proposed amendment, including a new constitution. Once
proposed, the Principal Chief would then have been obligated to publish the
proposal throughout the districts of the Cherokee Nation "at least six months
previous to the next election." After publication, if two-thirds of each house
of the National Council were to ratify the proposed amendment it would "be valid
to all intent and purposes" as a part of the Cherokee constitution, provided
certain reading requirements were also satisfied. Swimmer complied with none of
these procedures.
In fact,
Swimmer himself was ineligible even to serve in the position of Principal Chief
when he was first elected in 1975 because Section 2 of Article IV of the 1839
constitution expressly requires that no person shall be eligible to hold the
office of Principal Chief who "shall not have attained to the age of thirty five
years." In 1975, Swimmer was too young to be eligible. As someone without legal
authority even to hold office, Swimmer could hardly be deemed to possess the
inherent power to promulgate extraconstitutional rules for the ratification of a
new constitution.
One of
the candidates whom Swimmer defeated for Principal Chief, Sam Drywater, and
others outraqed by election irregularities, brought suit arguing that Swimmer
failed to meet the minimum age requirement of the 1839 constitution. The federal
district court which heard that case incorrectly ruled in an unpublished opinion
that the 1839 constitution was dead, relying in part on a legal opinion
expressed by Professor Rennard Strickland.....